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  • Qubes OS📢

    Analogically to GRUB, Xen had to take over some responsibilities from tboot. Due to the Intel TXT requirements for the boot process, a new entry point had to be developed to which SINIT ACM will return control. The new entry point was responsible for saving information that a TXT launch happened and cleaning up the processor state so that the booting of the Xen kernel could continue with the standard Multiboot2 path. Among others, if Xen detected TXT launch, it had to perform the special processor cores wakeup process (which has been rewritten from TrenchBoot Linux patches to Xen native code) and measure external components before using them (that is the Xen parameters, Dom0 Linux kernel, initrd and Dom0 parameters). Xen also had to reserve the memory regions used by Intel TXT, as when tboot was used. The relevant source code for the respective Qubes Xen package is available here (https://github.com/3mdeb/qubes-vmm-xen/pull/1). Installation and verification of TrenchBoot AEM on Qubes OS For a seamless deployment and installation of TrenchBoot AEM, the modifications Qubes OS components compilation. Those patches have been presented earlier with have been converted to patches which are applied to projects’ sources during links to Pull Requests. It allows building ready-to-use RPM packages that can be installed directly on an installed Qubes OS system. The pre-built packages can be downloaded from here (3mdeb.com/open-so…_aem_poc). The packages have been covered with SHA512 sums signed with 3mdeb’s Qubes OS TrenchBoot AEM open-source software release 0.x signing key available on 3mdeb-secpack repository (github.com/3mdeb/3…-key.asc). To verify the RPM packages, fetch the key with the following command: gpg --fetch raw.githubusercontent.com/3mdeb/3…-key.asc and then to verify the packages, please run: $ gpg --verify sha512sums.sig sha512sums gpg: Signature made wto, 31 sty 2023, 11:06:06 CET gpg: using RSA key 3405D1E4509CD18A3EA762245D289020C07114F3 gpg: Good signature from "Qubes OS TrenchBoot AEM open-source software release 0.x signing key" [unknown] gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. Primary key fingerprint: 3405 D1E4 509C D18A 3EA7 6224 5D28 9020 C071 14F3 $ sha512sum -c sha512sums grub2-common-2.06-1.fc32.noarch.rpm: OK grub2-tools-extra-2.06-1.fc32.x86_64.rpm: OK xen-licenses-4.17.0-3.fc32.x86_64.rpm: OK grub2-pc-2.06-1.fc32.x86_64.rpm: OK xen-libs-4.17.0-3.fc32.x86_64.rpm: OK grub2-tools-2.06-1.fc32.x86_64.rpm: OK xen-hypervisor-4.17.0-3.fc32.x86_64.rpm: OK grub2-pc-modules-2.06-1.fc32.noarch.rpm: OK xen-runtime-4.17.0-3.fc32.x86_64.rpm: OK grub2-tools-minimal-2.06-1.fc32.x86_64.rpm: OK python3-xen-4.17.0-3.fc32.x86_64.rpm: OK xen-4.17.0-3.fc32.x86_64.rpm: OK Check if GPG returns a good signature and if yes, check if the RPM checksum matches. All files must be in the same directory for the procedure to work. Note, in order to use the TrenchBoot AEM for Qubes OS, you have to own a TXT-capable platform with TXT-enabled firmware offering legacy boot. Such platform can be Dell OptiPlex 7010. You can visit Dasharo with Intel TXT support blog post (blog.3mdeb.com/2022/20…plex-txt) to learn more about such hardware and firmware. If you want to get OptiPlex with Dasharo pre-installed, you can get one from 3mdeb shop (3mdeb.com/shop/op…ram-copy). Building Xen and GRUB packages If you are not interested in compilation, skip to the next section (www.qubes-os.org…).

  • Qubes OS📢

    To not make the post excessively long, the procedure for building packages has been put into TrenchBoot SDK documentation (github.com/TrenchB…kages.md). Follow the instructions in the file to build the TrenchBoot AEM packages. Installing Xen and GRUB packages The following process was carried out and tested on Qubes OS 4.2 (openqa.qubes-os.org/tests/5…ts/55506). In order to install the packages one has to send the Xen and GRUB RPMs to the Dom0. Please note that moving any external files or data to Dom0 is potentially dangerous. Ensure that your environment is safe and the RPMs have the right checksums after copying them to Dom0. If you don’t know how to copy files to Dom0, refer to the Qubes OS documentation (www.qubes-os.org/doc/how…rom-dom0). Even before installing packages, it is required to enable the current-testing repository to avoid the need to install additional dependencies: sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-current-testing If the RPMs are inside Dom0, install them with the following command (assuming you downloaded all of them to one directory): sudo dnf update \ python3-xen-4.17.0-3.fc32.x86_64.rpm \ xen-4.17.0-3.fc32.x86_64.rpm \ xen-hypervisor-4.17.0-3.fc32.x86_64.rpm \ xen-libs-4.17.0-3.fc32.x86_64.rpm \ xen-licenses-4.17.0-3.fc32.x86_64.rpm \ xen-runtime-4.17.0-3.fc32.x86_64.rpm \ grub2-common-2.06-1.fc32.noarch.rpm \ grub2-pc-modules-2.06-1.fc32.noarch.rpm \ grub2-pc-2.06-1.fc32.x86_64.rpm \ grub2-tools-2.06-1.fc32.x86_64.rpm \ grub2-tools-extra-2.06-1.fc32.x86_64.rpm \ grub2-tools-minimal-2.06-1.fc32.x86_64.rpm Invoke sudo grub2-install /dev/sdX, where X is the letter representing the disk with /boot partition. Additionally, you will have to download SINIT ACM and place it in /boot partition/directory so that GRUB will be able to pick it up. Note it is only necessary if your firmware/BIOS does not include/place SINIT ACM in the Intel TXT region. You may obtain all SINIT ACMs as described here (github.com/QubesOS…b/README). Copy the SINIT ACM suitable for your platform to /boot directory. In the case of Dell OptiPlex it will be SNB_IVB_SINIT_20190708_PW.bin. Install Qubes AEM packages with the following command because Qubes OS 4.2 lacks AEM packages: qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-current-testing anti-evil-maid Enter the SeaBIOS TPM menu (hotkey t) and choose the clear TPM option. Then activate and enable the TPM by selecting the appropriate options. If in any case you are using proprietary firmware, clear the TPM and then enable and activate it in the firmware setup application. Follow the steps in set up TPM for AEM (github.com/QubesOS…b/README). The anti-evil-maid script may not work with LUKS2 in its current state, so make a fix according to this Pull Request (github.com/QubesOS…41/files) if needed. Now it is possible to setup Qubes OS AEM device (github.com/QubesOS…b/README). This will create the AEM entry in Qubes GRUB, but this entry is using tboot. You will need to edit the grub configuration file (/boot/grub2/grub.cfg) by copying the standard Qubes OS entry (without AEM) and adding: slaunch slaunch_module / before the multiboot2 directive, which loads Xen Hypervisor. Name the entry differently, e.g. Qubes OS with TrenchBoot AEM. Also, you will need to copy the AEM parameters for the Linux kernel: e.g.: aem.uuid=38474da6-7b2d-410d-95e6-8683005fb23f rd.luks.key=/tmp/aem-keyfile rd.luks.crypttab=no

  • Qubes OS📢

    We are still working on automating this step, so please bear with the manual file edition for now. Example GRUB entry: menuentry 'Qubes, with TrenchBoot AEM' --class qubes --class gnu-linux --class gnu --class os --class xen $menuentry_id_option 'xen-gnulinux-simple-/dev/mapper/qubes_dom0-root' { insmod part_msdos insmod ext2 set root='hd0,msdos1' if [ x$feature_platform_search_hint = xy ]; then search --no-floppy --fs-uuid --set=root --hint-bios=hd0,msdos1 --hint-efi=hd0,msdos1 --hint-baremetal=ahci0,msdos1 --hint='hd0,msdos1' 38474da6-7b2d-410d-95e6-8683005fb23f else search --no-floppy --fs-uuid --set=root 38474da6-7b2d-410d-95e6-8683005fb23f fi echo 'Loading Xen 4.17.0 ...' if [ "$grub_platform" = "pc" -o "$grub_platform" = "" ]; then xen_rm_opts= else xen_rm_opts="no-real-mode edd=off" fi slaunch slaunch_module /SNB_IVB_SINIT_20190708_PW.bin multiboot2 /xen-4.17.0.gz placeholder console=none dom0_mem=min:1024M dom0_mem=max:4096M ucode=scan smt=off gnttab_max_frames=2048 gnttab_max_maptrack_frames=4096 ${xen_rm_opts} echo 'Loading Linux 5.15.81-1.fc32.qubes.x86_64 ...' module /vmlinuz-5.15.81-1.fc32.qubes.x86_64 placeholder root=/dev/mapper/qubes_dom0-root ro rd.luks.uuid=luks-f1f850fa-59bf-4911-8256-4986c485e112 rd.lvm.lv=qubes_dom0/root rd.lvm.lv=qubes_dom0/swap i915.alpha_support=1 rd.driver.pre=btrfs rhgb quiet console=ttyS0,115200 aem.uuid=38474da6-7b2d-410d-95e6-8683005fb23f rd.luks.key=/tmp/aem-keyfile rd.luks.crypttab=no echo 'Loading initial ramdisk ...' module2 --nounzip /initramfs-5.15.81-1.fc32.qubes.x86_64.img } You may put the above entry to /etc/grub.d/40_custom to avoid the removal of the TrenchBoot AEM entry in case grub2-mkconfig will be called to overwrite grub.cfg. Please note such a workaround will not allow for automatic Xen, Linux, and initrd updates which may include security fixes. Making the grub.cfg seamless for TrenchBoot is still in progress. Verifying TrenchBoot AEM for Qubes OS The moment of truth has come. If the installation has been performed successfully, it is time to try out the TXT launch. So reboot the platform and choose the newly created entry with TrenchBoot. If it succeeds, you should get a TPM SRK and LUKS password prompts. After the system boots, one may check if DRTM PCRs (17 and 18, 19 is not used by TrenchBoot for now) have been populated: cat /sys/class/tpm/tpm0/pcrs PCR-00: 3A 3F 78 0F 11 A4 B4 99 69 FC AA 80 CD 6E 39 57 C3 3B 22 75 PCR-01: 4D E4 B0 42 71 50 E4 B1 DE C0 D7 F1 A0 29 A2 65 11 30 72 FD PCR-02: CE EA EC 0A 01 D5 7B A3 55 5A 4C 02 59 4A EE A1 C9 41 78 FB PCR-03: 3A 3F 78 0F 11 A4 B4 99 69 FC AA 80 CD 6E 39 57 C3 3B 22 75 PCR-04: 01 7A 3D E8 2F 4A 1B 77 FC 33 A9 03 FE F6 AD 27 EE 92 BE 04 PCR-05: BF 4E 38 B0 A7 7A 7A 4D 1A A9 B5 0F 59 D8 E5 F7 A6 46 8E 48 PCR-06: 3A 3F 78 0F 11 A4 B4 99 69 FC AA 80 CD 6E 39 57 C3 3B 22 75 PCR-07: 3A 3F 78 0F 11 A4 B4 99 69 FC AA 80 CD 6E 39 57 C3 3B 22 75 PCR-08: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 PCR-09: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 PCR-10: 9A 51 66 4D EB 1C B9 72 91 87 59 C4 89 AC 9A FF 7F 10 BF B3 PCR-11: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 PCR-12: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 PCR-13: 10 78 D0 16 8C 85 85 3A 7E 0A A1 D7 56 02 A7 05 D4 7F 22 64 PCR-14: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 PCR-15: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 PCR-16: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 PCR-17: 2A C9 64 F2 E2 96 50 B3 1D B7 2F 77 C4 7C A6 5D AA C8 4E E7 PCR-18: 84 4D D5 8D 95 EB 96 F6 CE 92 51 9C FD E2 33 45 71 C3 87 92 PCR-19: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

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  • Qubes OS📢

    In order to fulfill the same role as tboot, GRUB had to learn how to prepare the platform and perform the TXT launch. Most of the work for that particular part has been done by Oracle Team working on TrenchBoot for GRUB (www.mail-archive.com/grub-de…167.html). That work, however, covered the Linux kernel TXT launch only. What still had to be done was the Multiboot2 protocol support in GRUB to be able to TXT launch a Xen Hypervisor. The patches have been prepared for the respective Qubes GRUB package (https://github.com/3mdeb/qubes-grub2/pull/2). Xen modifications

  • Qubes OS📢

    (Source: A Practical Guide to TPM 2.0 (link.springer.com/book/10…2-6584-9)) The main role of Trusted Boot was to prepare a platform to be launched with Intel TXT (Intel’s DRTM technology) in an operating system agnostic way. It has been achieved by loading a tboot kernel with Multiboot protocol and the other system components as the modules. That way, TBOOT is the main kernel that starts first and prepares the platform for TXT launch. When the platform is ready, then tboot performs the TXT launch. The control is passed to SINIT Authenticated Code Module (ACM), a binary signed and provided by Intel designed for DRTM technology. SINIT ACM uses TXT to measure the operating system components in a secure manner. Then the control is handed back to the tboot kernel, which checks if the operation was successful and boots the target operating system. Although the tboot tried to be as OS agnostic as possible, some tboot presence awareness from the operating system is needed because the application processor cores (all cores except the main one) are left in a special state after TXT launch and cannot be woken up like in traditional boot process. To solve this problem, tboot installs a special processor wakeup procedure in the memory, which OS must call into to start the processor cores. Only then OS may initialize the processor per its own requirements. As one can see, the process is complex in the case of Intel TXT. Migration of all tboot responsibilities was not trivial and has been divided into the work on both GRUB and Xen Hypervisor side of Qubes OS. GRUB modifications

  • Qubes OS📢

    current TPM 1.2 and Intel TXT-only implementation. The advantage of TrenchBoot solution over existing Trusted Boot (https://sourceforge.net/p/tboot/wiki/Home/) is the easier future integration of AMD platform support, as well as TPM 2.0 and UEFI mode support. Before we dive into the technical details, it is important to highlight that this achievement was made possible through the generous contributions of Qubes OS community via OpenCollective. We would like to express our gratitude and extend a special thank you to all who have supported our favourite operating system. To continue supporting Qubes OS, please consider donating through OpenCollective page (https://opencollective.com/qubes-os). Thank you for your continued support! Modificationts to original Qubes OS AEM To replace the original implementation of Qubes OS AE there weren’t any AEM scripts modifications necessary. What actually had to change is GRUB and Xen Hypervisor (and Trusted Boot - to be removed). Why? one may ask… First of all, one must understand the role of a Trusted Boot (TBOOT). Trusted Boot DRTM flow

  • Qubes OS📢

    XSAs released on 2023-01-25 www.qubes-os.org/news/20…23-01-25 The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/). The security of Qubes OS is not affected. Therefore, no user action is required. XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS: (none) XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary: XSA-425 (Qubes 4.1 does not use the affected Xen version; denial-of-service only) About this announcement Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xe…Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (xenproject.org/develop…y-policy). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

  • Qubes OS📢

    ⚠️ This channel is updated ASAP after devs make an announcement to the project. Do you need Help? Do you want to participate in community conversations? Join the group! https://t.me/+QROgxw4yJttXvDNF
    QubesOS Chat

    (Unofficial Support) @QubesOS >No spam/ads/NSFW/shit posts/spam bots >Keep media like/stickers to a minimum. >Respect others >Stay on topic If you need help ask! Rules are enforced with ban or restrictions. thinfi.com/5byw

    Telegram

  • Qubes OS📢

    Support the Qubes OS Project via Proton's charity fundraiser! www.qubes-os.org/news/20…ndraiser The Qubes OS Project is grateful to have been selected as one of the beneficiaries of this year’s Proton (https://proton.me/) charity fundraiser alongside so many other wonderful organizations. The continued support of the privacy community means the world to us! For details about the fundraiser and how you can participate, please see the official Proton blog post: The 2022 Lifetime Account Charity Fundraiser has started! (proton.me/blog/20…ndraiser)

  • Qubes OS📢

    Fedora 35 reaches EOL on 2022-12-13 www.qubes-os.org/news/20…22-12-13 The Fedora Project has announced (lists.fedoraproject.org/archive…T6QHAYW5) that Fedora 35 will reach EOL (end-of-life (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life)) on 2022-12-13. We strongly recommend that all users upgrade (www.qubes-os.org/doc/tem…s/fedora) their Fedora templates and standalones to Fedora 36 no later than 2022-12-13. We provide fresh Fedora 36 template packages through the official Qubes repositories, which you can install in dom0 by following the standard installation instructions (www.qubes-os.org/doc/tem…s/fedora). Alternatively, we also provide step-by-step instructions for performing an in-place upgrade (www.qubes-os.org/doc/tem…-upgrade) of an existing Fedora template. After upgrading your templates, please remember to switch all qubes that were using the old template to use the new one (www.qubes-os.org/doc/tem…emplates). For a complete list of template releases that are supported for your specific Qubes release, see our supported template releases (www.qubes-os.org/doc/sup…releases). Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0. For details, please see our note on dom0 and EOL (www.qubes-os.org/doc/sup…releases).

  • Qubes OS📢

    XSAs released on 2022-12-06 www.qubes-os.org/news/20…22-12-06 The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/). The security of Qubes OS is not affected. Therefore, no user action is required. XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS: (none) XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary: XSA-423 (denial-of-service only) XSA-424 (denial-of-service only) About this announcement Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xe…Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (xenproject.org/develop…y-policy). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

  • Qubes OS📢

    Qubes Canary 033 www.qubes-os.org/news/20…nary-033 We have published Qubes Canary 033. The text of this canary is reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be available in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack). View Qubes Canary 033 in the qubes-secpack: github.com/QubesOS…2022.txt Learn how to obtain and authenticate the qubes-secpack and all the signatures it contains: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/ View all past canaries: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/ ---===[ Qubes Canary 033 ]===--- Statements ----------- The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1] state the following: 1. The date of issue of this canary is December 04, 2022. 2. There have been 87 Qubes security bulletins published so far. 3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494 4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce backdoors). 5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first fourteen days of March 2023. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. Special announcements ---------------------- None. Disclaimers and notes ---------------------- We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads. This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to produce false declarations. The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance. This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of the statements made here. Proof of freshness ------------------- Sun, 04 Dec 2022 03:11:56 +0000 Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss) Friends or Frenemies?: Significant Trans-Atlantic Divides Emerge in Global Chip War The Russian Mobilization: One Soldier's Effort to Avoid the War Tragedy in Mariupol: The Boy Who Lost His Family But Not His Hope A Year with Angela Merkel: "You're Done with Power Politics" Fears of Chinese Aggression Grow in Taiwan: "Where Are We Supposed to Go?" Source: NYT > World News (rss.nytimes.com/service…orld.xml) He Returned a Dazed Soldier to the Russians. Ukraine Calls It Treason. Landslide Tragedy Turns Italy’s Focus to Illegal Construction Why Is Rahul Gandhi Walking 2,000 Miles Across India? How China’s Police Used Phones and Faces to Track Protesters Ukraine Calls for Evacuations From a Russian-Controlled Area Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml) Cyril Ramaphosa: South Africa leader won't resign, says spokesman Ukraine war: Zelensky calls West's Russian oil cap 'weak' Ukraine war: New images show Russian army base built in occupied Mariupol Elnaz Rekabi: Family home of Iranian climber demolished Columbia peace talks with leftist ELN rebels make progress Source: Blockchain.info 00000000000000000000955f2976b1fbff0d0c47c262ea3ae6410e43f8218fb7 Footnotes ----------

  • Qubes OS📢

    [1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2] [2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/ -- The Qubes Security Team https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

  • Qubes OS📢

    QSB-087: Qrexec: Injection of unsanitized data into log output www.qubes-os.org/news/20…/qsb-087 We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 087: Qrexec: Injection of unsanitized data into log output (github.com/QubesOS…2022.txt). The text of this QSB is reproduced below. This QSB and its accompanying signatures will always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). More information about QSBs, including a complete historical list, is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 087 ]===--- 2022-11-23 Qrexec: Injection of unsanitized data into log output User action required --------------------- Users must install the following specific packages in order to address the issues discussed in this bulletin: For Qubes 4.1, in templates, standalones and dom0: - qrexec packages version 4.1.19 These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested by the community. [1] Once available, the packages are to be installed via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [2] Summary -------- Due to a bug in qrexec [3], a malicious qube that is allowed to call a qrexec service inside of another qube can inject unsanitized data into the log output of a process that handles incoming qrexec calls in the receiving qube. This log output may end up in `/var/log/qubes/qrexec.*.log`, `~/.xsession-errors`, or systemd's journal. Impact ------- An attacker could use this vulnerability in order to inject malicious data, such as terminal control codes, into log output in the hope that this data will be processed in a unsafe way, for example, by writing it directly to a potentially-vulnerable terminal emulator. In the default Qubes OS configuration, for example, there are qrexec services like `qubes.WindowIconUpdater` that any qube can call in dom0. An attacker who gains control of an untrusted qube could inject data containing malicious terminal control sequences into `/var/log/qubes/qrexec.*.log` in dom0. If the user views that log in a terminal emulator in a way that doesn't filter terminal escape codes (by simply using `cat` on the file, for example), the malicious data might then exploit a hypothetical bug in the terminal emulator. Note that this attack scenario, as described, has several layered requirements: 1. The user must voluntarily open a log file containing malicious data (or otherwise take action that causes the log file data to be parsed). 2. There must exist an independent vulnerability in the user's terminal emulator or in whichever program parses the log. (In other words, the attacker must chain independent vulnerabilities together.) 3. If using a terminal emulator, a command-line tool that does not filter control codes must be used. (`journalctl` prevents the display of unsafe sequences by default, but many other tools do not.) To be clear, the scenario in which the attacker uses the `qubes.WindowIconUpdater` service in order to exploit a hypothetical bug in a terminal emulator is just one conceivable scenario for how an attacker might exploit the vulnerability described in this bulletin. It is not the only way in which this vulnerability could be exploited, and the requirements listed for this scenario may not necessarily apply to other scenarios featuring different types of attacks (for example, using other qrexec services and exploiting other software that handles log output). Rather, this example is merely intended as an aid for understanding the nature of the vulnerability. Discussion ----------- Qubes OS features a framework known as "qrexec," which allows different qubes to communicate with each other in a controlled manner. [3][4]

  • Qubes OS📢

    These interactions are restricted by the system's RPC policies. [5] In particular, qrexec can be used to allow less trusted qubes to communicate with more trusted qubes, including dom0. Normally, the calling side can send data to the remote services' standard input and receive its standard output, standard error, and exit code data. Since it handles untrusted data flows, qrexec is designed under the assumption that an adversary will use it in order to launch an attack against one qube from another qube. Therefore, qrexec treats incoming data as untrusted and carefully sanitizes it. For example, when qrexec output is connected to a terminal, `qrexec-client` and `qrexec-client-vm` remove terminal control sequences. However, due to a mistake in qrexec message type handling, the calling side can send data marked as "standard error" (`MSG_DATA_STDERR`), and the remote side will print it to the standard error of the process handling incoming qrexec connections. This data flow was not expected. Such messages should be rejected, as they are expected only in the other direction. Consequently, this data is not appropriately sanitized, and potentially-malicious data may end up in log output. Credits -------- This issue was discovered by Demi Marie Obenour. References ----------- [1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/ [2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/ [3] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/ [4] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec-internals/ [5] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/rpc-policy/ -- The Qubes Security Team https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

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  • Qubes OS📢

    QSB-086: Speculative security issues on AMD CPUs (XSA-422) www.qubes-os.org/news/20…/qsb-086 We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 086: Speculative security issues on AMD CPUs (XSA-422) (github.com/QubesOS…2022.txt). The text of this QSB is reproduced below. This QSB and its accompanying signatures will always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). More information about QSBs, including a complete historical list, is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 086 ]===--- 2022-11-08 Speculative security issues on AMD CPUs (XSA-422) User action required --------------------- Users must install the following specific packages in order to address the issues discussed in this bulletin: For Qubes 4.1, in dom0: - Xen packages, version 4.14.5-13 These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested by the community. [1] Once available, the packages are to be installed via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [2] Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take effect. If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new Xen binaries. Summary -------- On 2022-11-08, the Xen Project published XSA-422, "x86: Multiple speculative security issues" [3]: | Researchers have discovered that on some AMD CPUs, the | implementation of IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) does not | behave according to the specification. | | Specifically, IBPB fails to properly flush the RAS (Return Address | Stack, also RSB - Return Stack Buffer - in Intel terminology; one of | the hardware prediction structures), allowing attacker controlled | values to survive across a deliberate attempt to purge said values. | | AMD have allocated CVE-2022-23824. XSA-422 also describes a second AMD vulnerability. However, since it is believed not to affect Xen, and therefore not to affect Qubes OS, it is omitted here. Impact ------- On Qubes OS installations with affected CPUs, a VM running in PV mode may be capable of inferring the memory contents of other running VMs, including dom0. In the default Qubes OS configuration, only the stubdomains for HVMs are in a position to exploit this vulnerability in order to attack other VMs. (Dom0 also runs in PV mode, but it is fully trusted.) Only certain AMD CPUs are affected. Please see AMD-SB-1040 [4] for the official list of affected models. (Note: XSA-422 states that Xen versions prior to 4.16 are not affected by this vulnerability. While Qubes OS uses a Xen version prior to 4.16, we have backported a Xen performance optimization [5] that assumes that IBPB works as previously specified. Therefore, the version of Xen used in Qubes is affected by this vulnerability even though its version numbers is lower than 4.16.) Credits -------- See the original Xen Security Advisory. References ----------- [1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/ [2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/ [3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-422.html [4] www.amd.com/en/corp…-sb-1040 [5] github.com/QubesOS…-s.patch -- The Qubes Security Team https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

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    XSAs released on 2022-11-08 www.qubes-os.org/news/20…22-11-08 The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/). The security of Qubes OS is affected. Therefore, user action is required. XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS: XSA-422 Please see QSB-086 (www.qubes-os.org/news/20…/qsb-086) for further details. XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary: (none) About this announcement Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xe…Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (xenproject.org/develop…y-policy). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

  • Qubes OS📢

    I decided to make the QubesOS chat public (@QubesChat) so people can easily join. If you haven't yet, feel free to join and participate in discussions or start a discussion!