Qubes OS📢. Страница 2

That depends on the number of bugs discovered in this release candidate and their severity. As explained in our release schedule (www.qubes-os.org/doc/ver…n-scheme) documentation, our usual process after issuing a new release candidate is to collect bug reports, triage the bugs, and fix them. This usually takes around five weeks, depending on the bugs discovered. If warranted, we then issue a new release candidate that includes the fixes and repeat the whole process again. We continue this iterative procedure until we’re left with a release candidate that’s good enough to be declared the stable release. No one can predict, at the outset, how many iterations will be required (and hence how many release candidates will be needed before a stable release), but we tend to get a clearer picture of this with each successive release candidate, which we’ll share in this section in future release candidate announcements. In the case of Qubes 4.2.0 specifically, we already know that there will be a second release candidate (in order to test the in-place upgrade procedure, if nothing else). As mentioned above, we expect to announce that second release candidate in approximately five weeks. The results of that second release candidate will determine whether a third one is required. What is a release candidate? A release candidate (RC) is a software build that has the potential to become a stable release, unless significant bugs are discovered in testing. Release candidates are intended for more advanced (or adventurous!) users who are comfortable testing early versions of software that are potentially buggier than stable releases. You can read more about Qubes OS supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) and the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) in our documentation. What is a minor release? The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... Hence, releases that increment the second value are known as “minor releases.” Minor releases generally include new features, improvements, and bug fixes that are backward-compatible with earlier versions of the same major release. See our supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases and our version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation for more information about how Qubes OS releases are versioned.

Fedora 38 templates available www.qubes-os.org/news/20…vailable New Fedora 38 templates are now available! We provide fresh Fedora 38 template packages through the official Qubes repositories, which you can install in dom0 by following the standard installation instructions (www.qubes-os.org/doc/tem…s/fedora). Alternatively, we also provide step-by-step instructions for performing an in-place upgrade (www.qubes-os.org/doc/tem…-upgrade) of an existing Fedora template. After upgrading your templates, please remember to switch all qubes that were using the old template to use the new one (www.qubes-os.org/doc/tem…emplates). As a reminder, Fedora 36 has reached EOL (www.qubes-os.org/news/20…23-05-16). If you have not already done so, we strongly recommend that you upgrade (www.qubes-os.org/doc/tem…s/fedora) all Fedora 36 templates and standalones to a supported template release (www.qubes-os.org/doc/sup…releases) immediately. Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (www.qubes-os.org/doc/sup…releases)).

tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6 tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100 Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351 gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full] The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK. Verify PGP signatures, e.g.: $ cd QSBs/ $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full] $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490 gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full] $ cd ../canaries/ $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full] $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490 gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full] Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. For this announcement (Qubes Canary 035), the commands are: $ gpg --verify canary-035-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-035-2023.txt $ gpg --verify canary-035-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-035-2023.txt You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the Qubes Canary 035 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.

(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.) 1 = I don't know or won't say 2 = I do NOT trust 3 = I trust marginally 4 = I trust fully 5 = I trust ultimately m = back to the main menu Your decision? 5 Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct unless you restart the program. gpg> q Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo. $ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'... remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done. remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done. remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done. remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591 Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done. Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done. Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies (www.qubes-os.org/securit…ity/pack) for important information about these keys.) $ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/* gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported gpg: Total number processed: 17 gpg: imported: 16 gpg: unchanged: 1 gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u Verify signed Git tags. $ cd qubes-secpack/ $ git tag -v `git describe` object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351 type commit

A PGP (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pr…_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pr…_Privacy) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all canaries so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether canaries are genuine. The only way to be certain that a canary is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures. Why should I care whether a canary is authentic? If you fail to notice that a canary is unhealthy or has died, you may continue to trust the Qubes security team even after they have signaled via the canary (or lack thereof) that they been compromised or coerced. Falsified canaries could include manipulated text designed to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project. How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary? The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (See here (www.qubes-os.org/securit…gnatures) for Windows and Mac options.) Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.: $ gpg --fetch-keys keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qu…-key.asc gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created gpg: requesting key from 'keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qu…-key.asc' gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: imported: 1 (See here (www.qubes-os.org/securit…gnatures) for more ways to obtain the QMSK.) View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.) $ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494 gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: unknown validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key gpg> fpr pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494 Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. See here (www.qubes-os.org/securit…gnatures) for more details and ideas for how to do that. Tip: Record the genuine QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future. Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q. gpg> trust pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: unknown validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys

Canaries provide an important indication about the security status of the project. If the canary is healthy, it’s a strong sign that things are running normally. However, if the canary is unhealthy, it could mean that the project or its members are being coerced in some way. What are some signs of an unhealthy canary? Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples: Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died. Missing statement(s). Every canary contains the same set of statements (sometimes along with special announcements, which are not the same in every canary). If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement. Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (www.qubes-os.org/securit…security) (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary. Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad? No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples: Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary. Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.) Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.) Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.) Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it). In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it, you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one. What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?

[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2] [2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/ -- The Qubes Security Team https://www.qubes-os.org/security/ Source: github.com/QubesOS…2023.txt Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (www.qubes-os.org/team…eam)’s PGP signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmRrV3YACgkQ1lWk8hgw 4GrB5Q/9GchNzTj7MoQqAHsYWkZTy2qB4YOXmo6HedUqr//vz6zHx+BDne4sBiuy V8knNY+7Wm3qvMaLvU56G7J35zJN/FeLKTbXcGBRk1sOxO67l4giuuwiq7ELTFvd WPXblm63LpwzTIoTP4lkqb3VVEaqA5Lrr4U+fe/oqiFRX7KE3ZUEwMw078b2qqTo NmoceN6N8QwEEuP0hhR6G1SfsVzIhl/tUFlFQQz6ymcWSu5qzechXzfPzUgD90pi yRoNu1QBTJmZ3sKSIPMfwSEn1j7ZonlN1NEfm8dYtukr8g0aWjkoY8d2X4P0PT1L jEPmzS5hJmqw9IhJvd2EgETHSj2Q71+MpI73vRVgvU0lhjYvkYIce72sTNC0k/28 k7HOvIkyt5jzLAGnPlvOulpBkxbvyf6jLjoyYLMp84qlGznv9cGoFSABXSQyPaha 15o/THnCJU3LbBd4ZfMwT8vgzW04tO4/AP5rc0s28nlq8QU02E5I8txylOJ5srrw 8A7q3yK03CpwI0JYDrc9JOBGdCP6i+a0qjDLNGzj8WwlalIdBGupoHxVp518yjr8 +6Sun9wOhKsf7HB6hAAdVr7fp7XoTAIdEczz7h+hm1zsbhRM50mZfWJksnfPy4RE cG1X6BqPIkXz51idqMm7l6+8K0EVZqvwGZBpC7S1CgqYKHTvbpg= =zV7L -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Source: github.com/QubesOS…marmarek Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (www.qubes-os.org/team…eam)’s PGP signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmRrWyoACgkQSsGN4REu FJAg2A//YILj71MatgNWIL6gmgTh66TyMSwdnWSe3lJSlOZW4LWAzu2U9S6JgK92 RpURskaLFd9Jvhv+7lUtuGVGMAyPBG9QxaxRrzvz6CVt5PgZG3x8Ll2o3CBaGeZ0 NX9jW+Jmq/abbkURtWfSb4IyF1sBbT2MH1rDRUlYIL4bCpkvwFbj7CQFtYN01DZO c98Vy9aciSwvaDhAqGrN9QdXBkNFcn/OsrKgeuCnpjKbKYUkOuhqM+WWbetXSbIU JHFRpUrAPbzeueRNvLq9b/G57dK5PiXiXkWTUGyzcHJnuU7XnZQArUJcDmliyI6k Y/v39T48m6aPK1oOFgRuJh5smjgHHhf/Y68F4eAmSaA234BFd2jSMezo8DEonyrv 0+pdGAerE9+/VHXP+tkD51M/gxAry5i86iNAl2tK+VPQjk88QIPpcymDhfTAD6/4 bCvu4j9eF4jUe9HFrvJLVOC/vXseJpGrg6z7O19GhhhNWTEhiE76cQY7owV/CtCR X8FGwiAngM449puxnP0uHYMxkXlmN3Pz52zOZcHZiQaLnUcANOiLSjH1+m1PKrlU TqQ7zO9B49XpGh3MXCwze37qT9RAqrxW7H+omH5GdoSUzpL8QqqD9RWfzlMvgqrR UKhH3Bt+LmgwAmBGlrqHYDLs5DTe5Id849mk7JZlv9UdZbQt4KQ= =kqLl -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Source: github.com/QubesOS…ig.simon What is the purpose of this announcement? The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published. What is a Qubes canary? A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (www.qubes-os.org/securit…security) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong. A list of all canaries is available here (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/). The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.) Why should I care about canaries?

Qubes Canary 035 www.qubes-os.org/news/20…nary-035 We have published Qubes Canary 035 (github.com/QubesOS…2023.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement. Qubes Canary 035 ---===[ Qubes Canary 035 ]===--- Statements ----------- The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1] state the following: 1. The date of issue of this canary is May 22, 2023. 2. There have been 89 Qubes security bulletins published so far. 3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494 4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce backdoors). 5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first fourteen days of September 2023. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. Special announcements ---------------------- None. Disclaimers and notes ---------------------- We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads. This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to produce false declarations. The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance. This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of the statements made here. Proof of freshness ------------------- Mon, 22 May 2023 08:16:45 +0000 Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss) Interview with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg: "Two Percent Is the Minimum of What We Need" Interview with Jordanian Foreign Minister Safadi: "Russia in Syria Is a Stabilizing Factor Compared To the Alternative" Yevgeny Prigozhin's Meat Grinder: A Moment of Truth for Russia's Wagner Group in Bakhmut The Three Worlds of Xinjiang: A Trip Through China's Uyghur Region Operation Counterstrike: What Might the Approaching Ukrainian Offensive Achieve? Source: NYT > World News (rss.nytimes.com/service…orld.xml) Greece Elections: New Democracy on Track to Win Most Votes As Russia Claims Victory in Bakhmut, Ukraine Sees Opportunity Amid Ruins Biden Announces More Aid for Ukraine as G7 Powers Meet in Japan Sudan’s Warring Sides Agree to Weeklong Ceasefire Inside the Barbecue City That Is China’s Hottest Tourist Destination Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml) Ukraine war: Bakhmut 'not occupied' by Russia, says defiant Zelensky Greek election: Centre-right Mitsotakis hails big win but wants majority Thousands mass for pro-EU rally in Moldovan capital, amid tensions with Russia US debt ceiling: Joe Biden urges Republicans to compromise as talks resume Watch: Green flash as meteor blazes across sky in Australia Source: Blockchain.info 00000000000000000002fb9f59b4c425b487ade7bad8dd6862159ec3030f650f Footnotes ----------

XSAs released on 2023-05-16 www.qubes-os.org/news/20…23-05-16 The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/). The security of Qubes OS is not affected. Therefore, no user action is required. XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS: (none) XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary: XSA-431 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-431.html) Qubes OS 4.1 uses an unaffected version of Xen (4.14). About this announcement Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xe…Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (xenproject.org/develop…y-policy). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

XSAs released on 2023-04-25 www.qubes-os.org/news/20…23-04-25 The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/). The security of Qubes OS is not affected. Therefore, no user action is required. XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS: (none) XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary: XSA-430 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-430.html) Shadow paging is disabled in Qubes OS at build time. Qubes OS 4.1 uses an unaffected version of Xen (4.14). About this announcement Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xe…Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (xenproject.org/develop…y-policy). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

Qubes OS 4.1.2 has been released! www.qubes-os.org/news/20…es-4-1-2 We’re pleased to announce the stable release of Qubes 4.1.2! This release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and upstream template OS upgrades that have occurred since the initial Qubes 4.1.0 release. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. Qubes 4.1.2 is available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page. Existing installations If you are already using any version of Qubes 4.1 (including 4.1.0, 4.1.1, 4.1.2-rc1, and 4.1.2-rc2), then you should simply update normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) (which includes upgrading any EOL templates (www.qubes-os.org/doc/how…o-update) you might have) in order to make your system effectively equivalent to this stable Qubes 4.1.2 release. No reinstallation or other special action is required. New installations If you would like to install Qubes OS for the first time or perform a clean reinstallation on an existing system, there has never been a better time to do so! Simply download (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) the Qubes 4.1.2 ISO and follow our installation guide (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/). What’s new in Qubes 4.1.2? Qubes 4.1.2 includes numerous updates over the initial 4.1.0 release, in particular: All 4.1 dom0 updates to date Fedora 37 template USB keyboard support in the installer (#7674 (github.com/QubesOS…ues/7674)) kernel-latest available as a boot option when starting the installer (#5900 (github.com/QubesOS…ues/5900)) What is a patch release? The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.1) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. (See supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases.) Installing any prior Qubes 4.1 release and fully updating (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) it results in essentially the same system as installing Qubes 4.1.2. You can learn more about how Qubes release versioning works in the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation. Reminder: Qubes 4.0 has reached end-of-life Qubes 4.0 reached EOL (end-of-life) on 2022-08-04 (www.qubes-os.org/news/20…22-08-04). If you’re still using Qubes 4.0, we strongly recommend upgrading to Qubes 4.1.

Qubes OS 4.1.2-rc2 has been released! www.qubes-os.org/news/20…-1-2-rc2 We’re pleased to announce the second release candidate (www.qubes-os.org…) for Qubes 4.1.2! This patch release (www.qubes-os.org…) aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and upstream template OS upgrades that have occurred since prior Qubes 4.1 releases. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. Qubes 4.1.2-rc2 is available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page. What’s new in Qubes 4.1.2? Qubes 4.1.2-rc2 includes numerous updates over the initial 4.1.0 release, in particular: All 4.1 dom0 updates to date Fedora 37 template USB keyboard support in the installer (#7674 (github.com/QubesOS…ues/7674)) kernel-latest available as a boot option when starting the installer (#5900 (github.com/QubesOS…ues/5900)) Fixes for bugs discovered in 4.1.2-rc1 Testing Qubes 4.1.2-rc2 If you’re willing to test (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/) this release candidate, you can help to improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you encounter (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/issue-tracking/). We strongly encourage experienced users to join the testing team (forum.qubes-os.org/t/joini…eam/5190)! Thank you to everyone who tested and reported bugs in 4.1.2-rc1! Existing Qubes 4.1 users If you’re not interested in testing this release candidate, and you’re already using Qubes 4.1, then you should simply update normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) (which includes upgrading any EOL templates (www.qubes-os.org/doc/how…o-update) you might have) in order to make your system essentially equivalent to this patch release. No special action is required on your part. When is the stable release? If no significant bugs are discovered in 4.1.2-rc2, we expect to announce the stable release of 4.1.2 in approximately one week. What is a release candidate? A release candidate (RC) is a software build that has the potential to become a stable release, unless significant bugs are discovered in testing. Release candidates are intended for more advanced (or adventurous!) users who are comfortable testing early versions of software that are potentially buggier than stable releases. You can read more about Qubes OS supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) and the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) in our documentation. What is a patch release? The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.1) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. (See supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases.) Installing any prior Qubes 4.1 release and fully updating (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) it results in essentially the same system as installing Qubes 4.1.2. You can learn more about how Qubes release versioning works in the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation.

Fedora 37 templates available www.qubes-os.org/news/20…vailable New Fedora 37 templates are now available! We provide fresh Fedora 37 template packages through the official Qubes repositories, which you can install in dom0 by following the standard installation instructions (www.qubes-os.org/doc/tem…s/fedora). Alternatively, we also provide step-by-step instructions for performing an in-place upgrade (www.qubes-os.org/doc/tem…-upgrade) of an existing Fedora template. After upgrading your templates, please remember to switch all qubes that were using the old template to use the new one (www.qubes-os.org/doc/tem…emplates). As a reminder, Fedora 35 has reached EOL (www.qubes-os.org/news/20…22-12-13). If you have not already done so, we strongly recommend that you upgrade (www.qubes-os.org/doc/tem…s/fedora) all Fedora 35 templates and standalones to a supported template release (www.qubes-os.org/doc/sup…releases) immediately. Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL (www.qubes-os.org/doc/sup…releases)).

corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2] [2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/ -- The Qubes Security Team https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

Qubes Canary 034 www.qubes-os.org/news/20…nary-034 We have published a new Qubes canary (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/). The text of this canary is reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures will always be available in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/). ---===[ Qubes Canary 034 ]===--- Statements ----------- The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1] state the following: 1. The date of issue of this canary is December 04, 2022. 2. There have been 87 Qubes security bulletins published so far. 3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494 4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce backdoors). 5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first fourteen days of March 2023. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. Special announcements ---------------------- None. Disclaimers and notes ---------------------- We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads. This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to produce false declarations. The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance. This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of the statements made here. Proof of freshness ------------------- Sun, 04 Dec 2022 03:11:56 +0000 Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss) Friends or Frenemies?: Significant Trans-Atlantic Divides Emerge in Global Chip War The Russian Mobilization: One Soldier's Effort to Avoid the War Tragedy in Mariupol: The Boy Who Lost His Family But Not His Hope A Year with Angela Merkel: "You're Done with Power Politics" Fears of Chinese Aggression Grow in Taiwan: "Where Are We Supposed to Go?" Source: NYT > World News (rss.nytimes.com/service…orld.xml) He Returned a Dazed Soldier to the Russians. Ukraine Calls It Treason. Landslide Tragedy Turns Italy’s Focus to Illegal Construction Why Is Rahul Gandhi Walking 2,000 Miles Across India? How China’s Police Used Phones and Faces to Track Protesters Ukraine Calls for Evacuations From a Russian-Controlled Area Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml) Cyril Ramaphosa: South Africa leader won't resign, says spokesman Ukraine war: Zelensky calls West's Russian oil cap 'weak' Ukraine war: New images show Russian army base built in occupied Mariupol Elnaz Rekabi: Family home of Iranian climber demolished Columbia peace talks with leftist ELN rebels make progress Source: Blockchain.info 00000000000000000000955f2976b1fbff0d0c47c262ea3ae6410e43f8218fb7 Footnotes ---------- [1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the

XSAs released on 2023-02-14 www.qubes-os.org/news/20…23-02-14 The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/). The security of Qubes OS is not affected. Therefore, no user action is required. XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS: (none) XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary: XSA-426 (SMT is disabled in Qubes OS by default) About this announcement Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xe…Overview) as part of its architecture (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (xenproject.org/develop…y-policy). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

Qubes OS 4.1.2-rc1 has been released! www.qubes-os.org/news/20…-1-2-rc1 We’re pleased to announce the first release candidate (www.qubes-os.org…) for Qubes 4.1.2! This patch release (www.qubes-os.org…) aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and upstream template OS upgrades that have occurred since prior Qubes 4.1 releases. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. Qubes 4.1.2-rc1 is available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page. What’s new in Qubes 4.1.2? Qubes 4.1.2-rc1 includes numerous updates over the initial 4.1.0 release, in particular: All 4.1 dom0 updates to date Fedora 37 template USB keyboard support in the installer (#7674 (github.com/QubesOS…ues/7674)) kernel-latest available as a boot option when starting the installer (#5900 (github.com/QubesOS…ues/5900)) Testing Qubes 4.1.2-rc1 If you’re willing to test (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/) this release candidate, you can help to improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you encounter (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/issue-tracking/). We strongly encourage experienced users to join the testing team (forum.qubes-os.org/t/joini…eam/5190)! Existing Qubes 4.1 users If you’re not interested in testing this release candidate, and you’re already using Qubes 4.1, then you should simply update normally (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) (which includes upgrading any EOL templates (www.qubes-os.org/doc/how…o-update) you might have) in order to make your system essentially equivalent to this patch release. No special action is required on your part. Release candidate planning If no significant bugs are discovered in 4.1.2-rc1, we expect to announce the stable release of 4.1.2 in two to three weeks. What is a release candidate? A release candidate (RC) is a software build that has the potential to become a stable release, unless significant bugs are discovered in testing. Release candidates are intended for more advanced (or adventurous!) users who are comfortable testing early versions of software that are potentially buggier than stable releases. You can read more about Qubes OS supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) and the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) in our documentation. What is a patch release? The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as ... Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.1) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. (See supported releases (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-releases/) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases.) Installing any prior Qubes 4.1 release and fully updating (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/) it results in essentially the same system as installing Qubes 4.1.2. You can learn more about how Qubes release versioning works in the version scheme (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) documentation.

PCR-20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 PCR-21: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 PCR-22: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 PCR-23: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Note that AEM will fail to unseal secrets as the PCRs are changed. To re-seal the secret you will have to perform the following steps after a successful boot with TrenchBoot: Re-seal the secret sudo anti-evil-maid-seal "". Reboot the machine and notice that the anti-evil-maid service no longer fails during boot. The secret should be displayed on the screen, indicating the machine boots correctly and unseals the secret. Summary It has been shown that TrenchBoot can be integrated to perform DRTM secure launch of Qubes OS in place of old tboot. Moreover, TrenchBoot is more extensible to other platforms like AMD. In the future, Anti Evil Maid will be available on both Intel and AMD platforms with both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0, thanks to TrenchBoot (which seemed to not be possible with tboot only). If you think we can help in improving the security of your firmware or you are looking for someone who can boost your product by leveraging advanced features of used hardware platform, feel free to book a call with us (calendly.com/3mdeb/c…-meeting) or drop us email to contact3mdebcom. If you are interested in similar content, feel free to sign up to our newsletter (newsletter.3mdeb.com/subscri…W6XnCeK6)