«From a Heideggerian and philosophical position, the existential-humanistic [psychotherapeutic] approach has been criticised for lacking philosophical depth (Craig, 2015; van Deurzen-Smith, 1991). Certainly, within the writings of Bugental (1981) and May (1969a), there are some fairly significant misunderstandings of key existential ideas, many of them revolving around a tendency to reduce ontological concepts to the ontic level (Craig, 2015). Bugental, for instance, writes that presence is dasein ‘in the purest sense’ (1981: 383), as if an individual can be more or less ‘there’, while May (1958) equates being-in-the-world with the experience of community. Yalom, too, has been criticised for simplifying and misrepresenting complex theoretical issues: reducing fundamental ontological questions to everyday issues and personal concerns (Craig, 2015). Craig, a US-based authority on daseinsanalysis, describes Yalom’s approach as an existential thematic stance, rather than a genuinely ontologically-orientated practice, and he sees it as a product of the Americanisation of existential therapy. He writes: ‘the intellectual, philosophical, and, especially, linguistic challenges of ontological seriousness do not make for an easy partnership with America’s deeply rooted preoccupations with materialism, optimism, pragmatism and individualism’ (Craig, 2015: 80).»
