The configuration change deleted a routing filter and allowed for all possible routes to the Internet to pass through the routers. As a result, the routers immediately began propagating abnormally high volumes of routes throughout the core network. Certain network routing equipment became flooded, exceeded their capacity levels and were then unable to route traffic, causing the common core network to stop processing traffic. As a result, the Rogers network lost connectivity to the Internet for all incoming and outgoing traffic for both the wireless and wireline networks for our consumer and business customers. Из отчёта для регулятора, в вордовском .DOCX, тут все регуляторы одинаковы. Там много confidential и ссылок на расширенный отчёт в приложении, поэтому был-ли это BGP_2_OSPF мы достоверное не узнаем, но прочитать всё равно стоит. Страничка со всеми отчётами вместе.